Opções de ações como renda fannie mae

Tagged com Fannie MAe

Lutando contra Foreclosures.

Nota do Editor: Fannie e Freddie excluíram quase 4 milhões de casas desde a crise financeira de 2008. As GSEs normalmente não podem provar que possuem o empréstimo se ele foi securitizado entre 1999 e 2014. Você sabia que Fannie Mae e Freddie não podem aceitar uma nota que não seja devidamente endossada e atribuída? Uma nota que não é apropriadamente endossada ou atribuída é considerada um erro & # 8216; Consulte as informações sobre Custódia de Documentos aqui.

A Fannie Mae e a Freddie Mac concluíram 15.683 ações de prevenção de execuções em maio, de acordo com o Relatório de Prevenção de Encerramento da FHFA (Federal Housing Finance Agency). Isso eleva o número total de ações de prevenção de despejos para 3.914.668 desde o início das conservatórias em setembro de 2008. Mais da metade das ações registradas em maio - ou 10.769 - foram modificações permanentes, em comparação com 11.328 em abril. Tudo dito, desde setembro de 2008, as empresas concederam mods de empréstimo permanente para 2.076.345 proprietários de imóveis em dificuldades.

Na mesma linha, a parcela de modificações com a principal renúncia representou 25% de todas as modificações permanentes em maio, de acordo com o relatório. As modificações com prazo estendido só aumentaram para 45 por cento durante o mês, graças aos constantes ventos contrários nos preços das casas. Além disso, um total combinado de 1.489 vendas e títulos em vigor selados em maio. Houve 10% a mais - ou 1.650 - em abril.

Quanto às métricas de desempenho hipotecário das Empreendimentos, a taxa de inadimplência séria caiu ainda mais, caindo de 1,01% no final de abril para 0,98% no final de maio. Empréstimos com atraso de 30 a 59 dias atingiram 402.780 em abril; eles ficaram em 348.141 em maio. Continuando sua trajetória descendente, os empréstimos inadimplentes com mais de 60 dias atingiram 1,3% em maio, caindo em relação aos 1,34% registrados em abril.

Em termos de execuções de hipotecas da Fannie e da Freddie, as vendas de terceiros e de vendas subiram 9%, de 5.523 em abril para 6.042 em maio. O arresto começa a cair 13 por cento, de 17.056 em abril para 14.905 em maio.

As cinco principais razões para a inadimplência em maio incluem contingenciamento de renda (21%), obrigações excessivas (22%), desemprego (7%), doença do principal morador ou familiar (6%) e dificuldades conjugais (3%).

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1º DCA CA: Não é tão rápido em foreclosures de carimbo de borracha.

Como vimos há meses, tem havido um fluxo constante de casos nos quais os tribunais voltaram às exigências fundamentais do devido processo legal e do estado de direito. Aqui o tribunal lembra (novamente) que o aviso judicial não é um substituto para a fundação de fatos em disputa e que o direito do proprietário de processar por hipoteca falsa não deve ser demitido, mesmo que seja mal formulado.

Veja CUPP v FNMA 8/2/17.

Enquanto mais uma vez vemos a lamentável tendência de manter as decisões essenciais fora dos registros públicos, também vemos que o tribunal agora compreende a falácia básica por trás dos empréstimos & # 8221; sujeito a falsas alegações de transferência, securitização, venda e compra.

E mais uma vez o tribunal declara com clareza os elementos básicos do direito processual. O fato de que você deve dinheiro não significa que você deve a alguém que te processe. Se a parte iniciar uma venda não judicial, estará sujeita ao mesmo rigor que nos processos judiciais. O procedimento não judicial não deveria permitir que estranhos ganhassem casos que perderiam se fossem obrigados a entrar com um processo.

O sistema de execução judicial não judicial destina-se a fornecer ao beneficiário do credor um recurso barato e eficiente contra um devedor inadimplente, ao mesmo tempo protegendo o mutuário de perdas ilícitas da propriedade e assegurando que uma venda realizada seja final entre as partes e conclusiva quanto a comprador fidedigno. & # 8221; (Yvanova vs. New Century Mortgage Corp. (2016) 62 Cal.4ª 919, 926 (Yvanova).)

Os elementos de uma ação ilícita para a execução equivocada são: "(1) o fiduciário ou credor hipotecário causou uma venda ilegal, fraudulenta ou voluntariamente opressiva de bens imóveis de acordo com uma força de venda em uma hipoteca ou escritura de propriedade." Confiar em; (2) o partido que atacou a venda (normalmente, mas nem sempre o fideicomissário ou o mortgagor) foi prejudicado ou prejudicado; e (3) nos casos em que o fiador ou o devedor hipotecário contestam a venda, o fiador ou o devedor hipotecário ofereceu o valor da dívida garantida ou foi dispensado da licitação. '& # 8221; (Miles v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. (2015) 236 Cal. Apl.4 394, 408.) Fundamentos que satisfazem o primeiro elemento incluem: quando o administrador não tinha o poder de encerramento, quando o devedor não tinha inadimplência, e quando o ato de confiança é vazio. (Lona v. Citibank, N. A. (2011) 202 Cal. App.4 89, 104-105). Um encerramento iniciado por um sem nenhuma autoridade para fazê-lo é errado & # 8221; e satisfaz o primeiro elemento. (Yvanova, supra, 62 Cal.4, p. 929).

nossa Suprema Corte observou que o agente fiduciário de um ato de confiança "age meramente como um agente do mutuário-fiduciante e credor-beneficiário". e, sob a seção 2924, subdivisão (a) (1), pode iniciar a execução não judicial apenas sob a direção da pessoa ou entidade que atualmente detém a nota e o interesse benéfico sob a escritura de confiança - o beneficiário original ou o seu cessionário - ou o agente dessa entidade. & # 8221; (Yvanova, supra, 62 Cal.4th, p. 927.) "No caso de inadimplência do tomador do empréstimo, apenas o beneficiário atual pode instruir o agente fiduciário a realizar o processo de execução não judiciária. # 8221; (Id. Em pp. 927-928.) No entanto, o tribunal também reconheceu que notas promissórias e escrituras de confiança são instrumentos negociáveis ​​que podem ser vendidos por um credor sem qualquer aviso ao mutuário e que um mutuário pode geralmente não levantem objecções à atribuição da nota e escritura de confiança. & # 8221; (Id. Na p. 927.) A corte de Yvanova concluiu:

& # 8220; Se uma atribuição supostamente necessária para a cadeia pela qual a entidade executora afirma que o poder é absolutamente nulo, ou seja, sem força legal ou efeito qualquer [citações], a entidade executora agiu sem autoridade legal ao buscar um agente fiduciário. ; s venda, & # 8221; e o mutuário teria legitimidade para processar a execução ilícita no caso de tal venda não autorizada. (Id. Na p. 935.)

A lógica dos réus & # 8217; argumento sem preconceito implica que qualquer um, mesmo um estranho à dívida, poderia declarar um calote e ordenar a venda de um fiduciário - e o tomador ficaria sem recurso porque, afinal, ele ou ela devia a dívida alguém, embora não para a entidade de encerramento. Este seria um "resultado estranho" # 8217; de fato. & # 8221; (Id. Na p. 938.) Um proprietário que foi impedido por um sem direito a fazê-lo sofreu uma invasão prejudicial de seus direitos legais nas mãos da entidade executora. Não é necessário mais para se levantar para processar. (Id. Na p. 939.) O tribunal desaprovou uma linha de decisões do Tribunal de Recurso que chegaram a conclusões contrárias. (Yvanova, na p. 939, nota 13; ver Jenkins vs. JPMorgan Chase Bank, NA (2013) 216 Cal. App.4º 497; Siliga vs. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (2013) 219 Cal. App. 4º 75; Herrera v. Federal Mortgage Assn. Nacional (2012) 205 Cal. App.4º 1495 (Herrera); Fontenot v. Banco Wells Fargo, NA (2011) 198 Cal. App.4º 256 (Fontenot).)

O tribunal de julgamento parece ter concordado com os entrevistados & # 8217; Contenção eles poderiam conclusivamente estabelecer que RTC realizou o interesse benéfico no momento da atribuição de 1995. Em seu preâmbulo, a Cessão de 1995 afirma que, em junho de 1993, o Escritório de Supervisão Econômica nomeou a RTC como receptora da WFSL. Além disso, recita que, em setembro de 1994, o Office of Thrift Supervision substituiu o conservador da WFSB pelo RTC. Finalmente, o preâmbulo declara que o RTC, como receptor da WFSB, é o beneficiário atual sob a Escritura de Confiança. & # 8221;

O tribunal de primeira instância poderia apropriadamente tomar conhecimento do fato de que a Cessão de 1995 foi registrada, a data de sua execução, as partes da transação, e seu efeito legal se esse efeito é indiscutível e claro da face do documento. (Ver Intengan v. Serviço de Empréstimo Domiciliar BAC LP (2013) 214 Cal. App.4th 1047, 1055; Fontenot, supra, 198 Cal. App.4th em pp. 264-265.) No entanto, ao contrário dos entrevistados & # 8217; afirmações repetidas, não podemos tomar conhecimento judicial da veracidade das recitações de fatos contidas na Tarefa de 1995. (Ver Yvanova, supra, 62 Cal.4, p. 924, fn. 1; Herrera v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co., (2011) 196 Cal. App.4 1366, 1369, 1375 [tribunal de primeira instância impropriamente verdade da recitação do boato, dentro da atribuição, que uma entidade em particular possuía interesse benéfico sob ação de confiança antes de sua designação]; Intengan, pp. 1055, 1057; Fontenot, na página 265.) Cupp contesta claramente a noção de que a RTC detinha a interesse benéfico no momento da Cessão de 1995. Concluímos que o tribunal de primeira instância errou ao julgar judicialmente que a RTC detinha o interesse benéfico na Escritura de Confiança na época da Cessão de 1995. [8]

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O Tesouro do Documento Fannie Freddie.

As opiniões libertárias expressas pelos colaboradores da Forbes são suas.

19 de julho de 2017 marcou o lançamento do primeiro conjunto de documentos do governo muito aguardado que abordou o governo sabia e quando, antes da implementação do seu patrimônio líquido varrer em 17 de agosto de 2012, que deu ao governo todos os lucros da operação daqueles duas entidades patrocinadas pelo governo (GSEs) Fannie Mae e Freddie Mac. Esse acordo foi incorporado na Terceira Emenda aos Acordos de Compra de Ações Preferenciais Seniores originais (SPSPAs) de setembro de 2008. Analiticamente, esses documentos são irrelevantes: o caso contra o governo é totalmente proibido sem eles. Na prática, esses documentos devem transformar todas as fases desse complexo litígio. A melhor maneira de vencer o governo em litígios é mostrar sua má fé por toda parte. É importante ver por que ambas as proposições são verdadeiras e como elas impactam no litígio em andamento. Eu estou oferecendo esta análise, na minha capacidade de assessor de investidores institucionais.

O Analytics. Um olhar atento aos documentos divulgados não nos dizem nada sobre a varredura de patrimônio líquido que não é aparente em face do acordo publicado que a Autoridade Federal de Finanças da Habitação (FHFA) eo Departamento do Tesouro usado para colocar o Net Worth Sweep (NWS) no lugar. Esses eram advogados especializados e eles queriam dizer o que diziam e diziam o que eles queriam dizer - a saber, que o único propósito do acordo era garantir que todos os lucros futuros gerados pela Fannie e pela Freddie terminassem nos bolsos do Tesouro dos Estados Unidos. acima e além do dividendo de 10% estabelecido no contrato original de 2008. Teria sido, é claro, imprudente que as duas agências do governo anunciassem sua intenção de conspirar publicamente, de modo que se empenharam em uma transação planejada, mas fingida, que fez parecer que sua ação conjunta era a salvação de Fannie e Freddie. . O suposto benefício era que as empresas estavam isentas de qualquer obrigação de pagar dinheiro ao Tesouro, quando não tinham dinheiro para pagá-lo.

Infelizmente, para o governo, as empresas e seus acionistas privados já tinham duas defesas contra um resultado tão infeliz. Primeiro, se uma empresa é insolvente, não pode pagar dinheiro a seus acionistas como dividendos ou a seus credores de qualquer forma. Portanto, é uma simples farsa alegar que a consideração foi fornecida ao dispensar as partes de qualquer obrigação de pagar quantias que não poderiam pagar em nenhum caso. Segundo, como uma questão legal, os SPSAs continham a chamada cláusula de pagamento em espécie, que permite que a Fannie e a Freddie não paguem dividendos em dinheiro desde que os valores diferidos acumulem a uma taxa de 12% ao ano, dois pontos a mais que a taxa de 10% estipulada para dividendos em dinheiro.

A capacidade de exercer essa opção diferida traz consigo duas consequências inequívocas. Primeiro, significava que o Tesouro nunca teve que fazer mais adiantamentos para as entidades se achasse imprudente fazê-lo. Os montantes de GSE devidos continuariam a acumular-se. Consequentemente, não poderia haver uma espiral de morte na qual o Tesouro teria que fazer adiantamentos para sustentar uma empresa sem valor, e nenhum esgotamento dos compromissos de financiamento do Tesouro. Segundo, esse arranjo não era um convite aberto para os conservadores das empresas desperdiçarem dinheiro. Quaisquer distribuições líquidas aos acionistas privados das empresas, seja como dividendos ou distribuições em liquidação, estavam subordinadas às ações preferenciais seniores do governo.

Seria, portanto, insensato que qualquer administrador prudente incorresse em taxas de pagamento mais altas para os preferidos seniores, se houvesse dinheiro disponível para fazer os dividendos correntes em dinheiro. O acordo inicial teve uma estabilidade financeira embutida que funcionou bem em todos os estados do mundo. Em nenhum momento dos documentos, o Tesouro fez referência a essa cláusula decisiva.

Da mesma forma, o tratamento judicial do acordo de dividendo completo sobre a moção para demitir, não menos, completamente mal compreendido estas disposições. Esse atalho é perfeitamente permissível se as opiniões fizerem uma avaliação precisa da transação declarada. Mas isso não era para ser tido. Na decisão original do tribunal de primeira instância de 2014 do juiz Royce Lamberth em Perry Capital vs. Lew, essa opção adicional de acionista foi interpretada como uma penalidade por atraso no pagamento, que, portanto, teve que ser ignorada na decisão sobre a validade do NWS. Da mesma forma, a cláusula foi colocada de lado sobre a decisão da maioria do Circuito DC em Perry v. Mnuchin, com o pronunciamento simplista de que o diretor da FHFA, como fiduciário, não teve que se valer da única opção que funcionou. para a maior vantagem de seus beneficiários, mas poderia, em vez disso, gastar todo o dinheiro excedente para o governo, sabendo que não recebia nada de valor em troca. Por que essa declaração extrema? Porque não há um estado do mundo em que os acionistas privados estivessem em melhor situação após o NWS do que estavam sem ele. No lado negativo, não havia dinheiro de qualquer maneira. No lado positivo, eles também não ganharam dinheiro, já que todo o dinheiro acima do dividendo padrão de 10% (ou, se apropriado, 12%) foi para o governo. O governo deveria ter perdido a moção para demitir.

Os documentos . A mensagem geral dos documentos publicados está em perfeita sincronia com a estrutura básica do negócio subjacente. Nenhum deles é privilegiado remotamente. A única informação prejudicial que eles contêm é diretamente pertinente ao caso, ou seja, sobre o estado de espírito dos principais funcionários do governo às vésperas do NWS. Para melhor entender seu impacto, é útil examinar os documentos em ordem cronológica inversa, começando com aqueles que foram preparados pouco antes da implementação do NWS. O ponto é bem simples. Quaisquer que fossem as incertezas anteriores, dadas as indicações da força financeira das GSEs antes da promulgação planejada, o governo poderia simplesmente ter cancelado o NWS sem qualquer fanfarra pública, sabendo que a situação financeira havia se estabilizado. Ao avançar com o NWS, os altos funcionários do governo sabiam que o NWS não era uma operação de salvamento para evitar o colapso do resgate, mas um esforço calculado para retirar todos os lucros dos GSEs em uma transação sem risco para o Tesouro.

Assim, na segunda-feira, 13 de agosto, quatro dias antes do anúncio do NWS, um e-mail de Jim Parrott a Brian Deese, assume a visão sincera de que:

Estamos nos certificando de que cada uma dessas entidades paga ao contribuinte de volta cada dólar de lucro que eles ganham, não apenas um dividendo de 10%. (ênfase no original) O contribuinte acabará por recolher mais dinheiro com as mudanças. Com o conjunto geral de mudanças, removemos qualquer dúvida sobre o destino a longo prazo dessas entidades: elas NÃO poderão retornar a entidades lucrativas no centro de nosso sistema de financiamento habitacional, mas, em vez disso, serão liquidadas e substituídas por um sistema impulsionado pelo capital privado e menor risco para o contribuinte.

Isso, claro, é exatamente o que o NWS fez. A leitura óbvia deste documento é que, quatro dias antes da NWS, todas as autoridades relevantes na véspera do NWS sabiam que o governo deveria obter lucros acima da taxa acordada de dividendos de 10%, apesar de quaisquer dúvidas anteriores do Tesouro e da FHFA terem vários meses. antes sobre o desempenho financeiro esperado da Fannie e Freddie.

Pouco antes do NWS, essas autoridades sabiam com certeza que não havia a possibilidade de uma espiral de morte em que o Tesouro constantemente teria que emprestar dinheiro para as GSEs, a fim de cobrar o dividendo necessário. Esse resultado é confirmado por um memorando de 30 de julho de 2012, que anuncia a intenção do governo de anunciar as mudanças na sexta-feira, 10 de agosto, após o fechamento dos mercados. (A data real de lançamento foi uma semana depois, ainda na sexta-feira de agosto, a fim de evitar séria atenção da mídia.) O raciocínio declarado do memorando para o NWS era “As GSEs reportarão ganhos muito fortes em 7 de agosto, que serão em excesso do dividendo de 10% a ser pago ao Tesouro. ”A informação relevante não havia mudado de 30 de julho para o anúncio do NWS em 17 de agosto.

O próximo documento crítico foi datado de 25 de junho de 2012 da oficial do Tesouro Mary Miller para Michael Stegman. Relata-se que Ed DeMarco, o chefe em exercício da FHFA, tinha algumas dúvidas sobre como proceder, mas não há dúvidas sobre a crescente força financeira da Fannie e Freddie. Sua porção relevante diz:

Ao longo de semanas de negociação de possíveis aditamentos aos PSPAs, ele [DeMarco] nunca questionou a necessidade de ajustar o cronograma de dividendos este ano. Como o secretário levantou a possibilidade de um pacto de relações públicas, DeMarco não vê mais a urgência de alterar os PSPAs este ano. Ele levantou duas razões concorrentes para essa nova posição: (1) as GSEs estarão gerando grandes receitas nos próximos anos, permitindo-lhes pagar o dividendo anual de 10% no futuro, mesmo com os limites; e (2) a instituição de um patrimônio líquido no lugar do dividendo prolongará ainda mais a vida das GSEs de tal forma que eliminaria a urgência de o Congresso atuar na reforma do financiamento habitacional de longo prazo. Ele agora vê as emendas do PSPA como uma maneira secreta de manter as GSEs vivas - chegando a um plano do tipo 3 Opção [pedindo a separação de veículos para fins especiais para bens bons e ruins] sem a necessidade de legislação.

Para esses propósitos, a parte mais importante do documento é o reconhecimento das grandes receitas que serão suficientes para cobrir os pagamentos de dividendos no futuro com os limites estabelecidos, o que significa que o Tesouro entendeu que nenhum avanço adicional seria necessário. A terceira opção mencionada no último parágrafo refere-se a um documento de posicionamento submetido ao Secretário Timothy Geithner em 12 de dezembro de 2011, ou mais de oito meses antes do resgate. Continha uma discussão preliminar de várias opções políticas, a primeira das quais pedia a reestruturação dos “pagamentos de dividendos do Tesouro de uma taxa anual fixa de 10% para um pagamento variável baseado no patrimônio líquido disponível (ou seja, estabelecer uma varredura de renda). Isso garantirá que a capacidade restante de financiamento do PSPA não seja reduzida no futuro por sorteios para pagar dividendos. No mínimo, tanto Miller quanto Stegman sabiam que tanto a Fannie quanto a Freddie poderiam se tornar rentáveis ​​em breve, o que aconteceu quando o NWS entrou em vigor em agosto de 2012. Esse caso é aberto e fechado.

Comentários sobre os documentos liberados. A maioria dos comentaristas que leram os documentos pensaram que eles revelaram que o Tesouro e a FHFA tinham pleno conhecimento de que as GSEs haviam transformado a esquina em território positivo quando o NWS foi adotado. O artigo de Gretchen Morgenson de 23 de julho foi intitulado “U. S. Previsto um melhor retorno na obtenção dos lucros da Fannie e da Freddie. ”Foi bem entendido”, ela escreveu “que a decisão de desviar os lucros sabia que a mudança provavelmente geraria mais receita para o Tesouro. Ela concluiu explicitamente que a explicação declarada do Tesouro, para proteger os contribuintes de novas perdas, foi contraditada pelos documentos que mostravam que “já em dezembro de 2011, o alto funcionário do Tesouro sabia que a Fannie e Freddy logo se tornariam rentáveis”.

Seus pontos de vista foram adotados no atacado pela HousingWire, onde mais uma vez a manchete conta toda a história: “Documentos recém-lacrados revelam motivo real para a Fannie, Freddie Profit sweep: Report: Geithner sabia que em 2011 as GSEs logo seriam lucrativas”. A mesma história, quando escreveu “Novos documentos dão esperança aos Acionistas da Fannie que buscam reparação”, indicando especificamente que a evidência solapa a principal afirmação do governo de que o NW era necessário para evitar “um processo conhecido como 'sorteio circular' ou 'espiral da morte'. "

O impacto no litígio. A última pergunta é como essas revelações afetarão o litígio em andamento. Os documentos foram divulgados em conexão com a reivindicação de Fairholme no Tribunal Federal de Reivindicações. A sólida teoria desse caso é que o governo confiscou a propriedade dos acionistas quando os privou de seus direitos a dividendos, suas preferências de liquidação e seus direitos de voto - os três atributos que dão valor às ações. Da mesma forma, Jerome Corsi, da InfoWars, declarou: “Novos documentos suportam Fannie Mae e Freddie mac Acionistas no tribunal: Apologista [John Carney] Ignora Evidências Eles ilegalmente confiscaram os ganhos de Fannie e Freddie.”

Essa alegação é feita por um exame dos documentos relevantes. Se esses casos são tratados como expropriação direta de fundos, regidos pela regra per se em Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp. a má fé do governo não deve importar. Mas, se, como até agora tem sido o caso, o NWS é avaliado sob a doutrina mais flexível da Penn Central Transportation Company v. Cidade de Nova York, essa evidência preenche qualquer lacuna no caso do demandante. A Penn Central exige um exame explícito das razões do governo para impor a varredura.

A má-fé do governo do Tesouro sobrepõe-se a qualquer justificativa do governo em potencial para fazer com que esses acionistas tenham uma parcela desproporcional de financiamento das atividades do governo geral. Na linguagem da Penn Central, o NWS “interferiu em expectativas distintas e apoiadas em investimentos”, sem referência a quaisquer preocupações tradicionais de poder de polícia com saúde e segurança. Como o juiz Holmes brincou na Pensilvânia Coal v. Mahon "um forte desejo público de melhorar a condição pública não é suficiente para garantir o desejo por um corte mais curto do que a forma constitucional de pagar pela mudança." O governo atendeu às suas necessidades financeiras das receitas gerais, não escolhendo o bolso dos acionistas privados. A reivindicação alegada deve, portanto, ser solidificada pela liberação desses documentos.

Os documentos revelados nos processos judiciais também devem influenciar o tratamento das várias violações dos pedidos fiduciários e contratuais em Perry Capital v. Lew e em Perry Capital v. Mnuchin. Tanto o tribunal de primeira instância em Lew quanto o Circuito D. C em apelação em Mnuchin permitiram que o governo ganhasse um julgamento sumário, sem o benefício de qualquer descoberta. Uma leitura correta desses documentos mostra que eles deram um julgamento sumário para a parte errada, o governo. Mas agora que Mnuchin está de volta ao Tribunal Distrital em prisão preventiva, ele deve levar esses documentos em consideração ao tomar sua decisão sobre a validade das reivindicações contratuais remanescentes do demandante.

Na primeira vez, a Circuit Court desfigurou os testes apropriados para determinar os danos esperados. Sua decisão de dividir as ações em circulação em diferentes subclasses destrói o mercado subjacente, que pode funcionar apenas se todas as ações tiverem atributos idênticos. Por isso, foi um grande erro insistir em que as reclamações dos acionistas fossem fracionadas, de forma que as expectativas individuais dos acionistas dependessem de alguma forma se as ações fossem compradas antes ou depois da NWS entrar em vigor. A resposta correta em todos os casos é que as expectativas dos acionistas são fixadas no momento da emissão inicial e da compra dessas ações, de modo que quaisquer revendas ou outras transferências dessas ações não afetem a natureza dos pedidos contratuais.

A opinião revisada do Circuito D. C. de 17 de julho de 2017 confirma esse erro categórico. No entanto, ele ainda se desvia por causa de sua incapacidade de afirmar afirmativamente como uma questão de direito a regra correta que trata todas as ações de forma idêntica. Em vez disso, afirma que o questionamento relevante sobre a prisão preventiva é “se a Terceira Emenda violou as expectativas razoáveis ​​das partes”. O governo sabia, na época do NWS, que estava reivindicando mais do que tinha direito. Esse fato deve moldar as expectativas razoáveis ​​das partes privadas que têm o direito de pensar que o governo não abusará conscientemente de seu poder por meio de transações colusivas destinadas a despojar os acionistas de todo o valor em uma transação simulada.

O NWS beneficiou o governo e apenas o governo. O Tribunal Distrital não pode decidir este caso em um vácuo informacional, mas deve levar essa informação em consideração ao determinar as expectativas razoáveis ​​dos acionistas. O abuso do NWS é tão relevante para as reivindicações do contrato como para as reivindicações de ganhos. O juiz Lamberth não deve ignorar evidências indiscutíveis, o que aponta para a viabilidade total das reivindicações contratuais que o Circuito D. C. lhe pediu para reavaliar a prisão preventiva.

Richard A. Epstein é o professor Laurence A. Tisch de Direito na NYU, membro sênior da Hoover Institution, e conferencista sênior na Faculdade de Direito da Universidade de Chicago.

Espalhe a palavra.

Refinanciamento hipotecário? Talvez você não precise dessa avaliação depois de tudo.

Nota do Editor: O Fed está fazendo tudo o que está ao seu alcance para manter a bolha imobiliária para manter a demanda, diminuindo os requisitos de pontuação de crédito, oferecendo adiantamentos mais baixos (1 a 3%) e agora removendo o credor. 8217; s responsabilidade pelas avaliações da casa. O que poderia dar errado?

Por KENNETH R. HARNEY

Precisamos sempre de um avaliador para nos dizer o valor de uma casa? As duas maiores fontes de financiamento hipotecário no país - Freddie Mac e Fannie Mae - não pensam.

Sem anúncio público formal, em 19 de junho, a Freddie Mac começou a implementar seu plano de transição para uma hipoteca livre de avaliação para certos pedidos de empréstimo. Embora limitado inicialmente a alguns refinanciamentos, a Freddie espera expandir o conceito para as compras de casas nos próximos meses. De acordo com o programa, os mutuários não terão mais que pagar centenas de dólares por uma avaliação profissional - uma reversão da antiga prática do setor hipotecário. Não haverá encargos de avaliação tradicionais no fechamento e os credores não serão mais obrigados a assumir a responsabilidade pela exatidão das avaliações residenciais. Atualmente, o programa está limitado a candidatos que tenham pelo menos 20% de participação em suas casas e não estejam sacando dinheiro.

A Fannie Mae, outra gigantesca empresa de financiamento supervisionada pelo governo, vem oferecendo discretamente refinanciamentos sem avaliação por meses. Ambas as empresas enfatizam que elas só permitem renúncias de avaliações quando possuem dados substanciais sobre a propriedade envolvida e o mercado imobiliário local. A Fannie diz que tem um banco de dados contendo mais de 23 milhões de relatórios de avaliação previamente concluídos e usa “análises proprietárias” para chegar a estimativas de valor. Ao contrário da Freddie Mac, a Fannie Mae não indicou se planeja expandir seu conceito de “isenção de inspeção de propriedade” para empréstimos para compra de casas, embora fontes da indústria digam que esperam.

Os credores hipotecários geralmente estão entusiasmados com os movimentos das duas empresas. Dave Norris, diretor de receita da loanDepot, um dos maiores financiadores de varejo do país, diz que "alavancar a tecnologia" para chegar às avaliações das propriedades "dá certeza aos consumidores" sobre o status de sua aplicação antecipadamente, reduz drasticamente o tempo necessário para obter para fechar, além de economizar dinheiro. Aproximadamente 12% dos refinanciamentos do loanDepot através da Fannie Mae já estão sendo avaliados sem avaliação, disse Norris.

"Os consumidores definitivamente apreciam isso", acrescentou. Há mais dinheiro em seus bolsos e a experiência total é melhor.

Pete Mills, vice-presidente sênior da Mortgage Bankers Association, também acolheu o conceito livre de avaliação. "Se há uma maneira de usar a tecnologia para simplificar ou automatizar o processo, garantindo que os mesmos padrões de precisão sejam atendidos", disse ele, "isso beneficiaria tanto os credores quanto os consumidores e deveria ser perseguido". direito de solicitar uma avaliação completa, se quiserem uma, acrescentou Mills.

Não é de surpreender que os avaliadores considerem toda a tendência como um pesadelo iminente - potencialmente enviando-os para o destino de fabricantes de chicotes de buggy, agentes de viagens e outros cujas indústrias foram dizimadas por novas tecnologias. Ao contrário dos fabricantes de chicotes de buggy em uma era de automóveis, no entanto, os avaliadores argumentam que eles têm um papel legítimo e contínuo. Simplesmente não há substituto tecnológico para o que eles trazem para a mesa: olhos, ouvidos, narizes e a capacidade de analisar independentemente uma casa, seu interior, o ambiente da vizinhança e as condições do mercado, e chegar a uma opinião precisa do seu valor atual. Os programas de computador podem estar repletos de dados e algoritmos, mas eles não têm idéia sobre quais danos - ou melhorias - podem estar presentes dentro de uma casa.

"Eu entrei em casas de 5 anos que estão em tão mau estado que parecem não ter sido mantidas por 25 anos", diz Pat Turner, um avaliador de Richmond, Virgínia. A eliminação de avaliações é um “retrocesso” nas práticas desastrosas dos credores subprime durante o boom e a quebra da habitação, disse ele. "Este é um retorno para nenhum doc e baixa doc em esteróides."

Carl S. Schneider, um avaliador em Tulsa, Oklahoma, diz que o caminho em que Fannie e Freddie estão "está repleto de perigos", não apenas para os bancos, mas para os contribuintes que podem ter que socorrê-los. Os bancos de dados que a Fannie e a Freddie estão usando podem conter informações de avaliação volumosas enviadas anteriormente como parte dos arquivos de hipoteca. Mas "os dados de propriedade envelhecerão e mudarão sem serem atualizados" se um grande número de novas avaliações não estiver sendo feito, disse ele. Sem novas avaliações profissionais que incluam informações atualizadas sobre as condições internas das residências - além de observações sobre a presença de características ambientais que depreciam o valor na área e que provavelmente não serão captadas pelos computadores - “para onde tudo isso vai levar?” Pergunta Schneider.

Onde de fato? Fannie and Freddie are confident that they are introducing appraisal-free mortgages carefully and responsibly. Appraisers have serious doubts. The jury is out.

Espalhe a palavra.

Fannie Mae eases credit requirements boosting purchasing power by 22%

WOW! BIG Housing & Mortgage Easing News: This Changes Thing.

Fannie Mae pulls a 2006-style credit ease…this changes things.

QUESTION : How do you know you that you are past mid-stage in a housing bubble?

QUESTION : How do you know that the overlords are worried about a housing market correction?

QUESTION : How do you know the keepers-of-the-economy are worried that the mortgage-refi-capital-conveyor-belt coming to a halt will drag the US into recession?

ANSWER : Because Fannie Mae just eased credit guidelines to such a degree — specifically, ratcheted higher Debt-to-Income Ratio tolerances from 43% to 50% of GROSS INCOME – purchasing/refinancing power was increased over 20% instantly.

Remember, counter-cycle credit guidelines – loosening credit guidelines to fight a tightening credit cycle — is exactly what created BUBBLE 1.0 from 2003 to 2007.

Additionally, Fannie made it much easier for self-employed borrowers and ratcheted higher the LTV/CLTV/HCLTC allowances to 95% on all their loans (including interest only) to match the current 30-year fixed guidelines.

Bottom line : This changes things at the margin; INCREASES PUCHASE & REFINANCE POWER good credits by 22% and requires less down/equity , in order to compete with FHA . Put another way, somebody can suddenly buy 22% more house, or refinance a much larger loan, than they could previously on the same income with less down, or equity respectively.

Then, again, based on data I gather and watch daily it may be too late to keep house prices in the green . In fact, major, core metro regions will be printing NEGATIVE YY house prices this year; he bubbliest parts of the San Fran Bay Area already are.

Think about it…when has. gov or the Fed ever acted truly proactively? Perhaps Fannie’s models show house prices rolling over in the nearer-term and these changes are a hail-Mary to try to counter that.

BUT, this will also make it so the ultimate reversion to the mean is that much more destructive.

ITEM 1) MY CHART SHOWS THAT GOING FROM 43% TO 50% DTI INCREASES PURCHASING POWER BY 22%.

The 1 st column shows you could buy a $370k house with an income of $66k under the OLD, 43% DTI guidelines. NOW, (2 nd column) you can buy a $450k house with the same income under the NEW, 50% DTI guidelines.

Note, this assumes 20%, which is rare. At 5% down, purchase prices decline substantially but the 20% increase remains intact.

ITEM 2) FANNIE MAE EASES GUIDELINES TO COUNTER RATE INCREASES (JUST LIKE DURING BUBBLE 1.0)

RED HIGHLIGHTS ARE MY EMPAHSIS. mH.

New Fannie Mae DU Version Eases DTI Requirements.

May 31 2017, 10:55AM.

Fannie Mae has announced changes in underwriting for loans submitted to its Desktop Underwriter (DU), Version 10.1. The new DU version will be implemented on or after the weekend of July 29 . The changes are outlined in release notes issued on Tuesday and will apply to new loan casefiles submitted to DU on or after the weekend of July 29, 2017. Loan casefiles created in DU Version 10.0 and resubmitted after the weekend of July 29 will continue to be underwritten through DU Version 10.0.

Among the more significant changes accompanying the new version are the following.

The maximum allowable debt-to-income (DTI) ratio that can be submitted in DU will be 50% . For DTIs between 45 and 50 percent, certain additional compensating factors will no longer be required. Cases exceeding a 50 percent DTI will receive an “ineligible” recommendation. The criteria that determines the documentation required to verify a self-employed borrower’s income will be updated and the number of DU loan casefiles eligible for the one year of personal and business tax return documentation requirements will increase. The maximum allowable LTV, CLTV, and HCLTV ratios (LTV ratios) for adjustable-rate mortgages will be aligned with fixed-rate mortgage LTV ratios for all transaction, occupancy, and property types, up to a maximum of 95 % . Additional information on the effective dates of this change will be available in the Selling Guide. A loan casefile with a disputed tradeline that is approved with that information will no longer require further action . If such a loan casefile does not receive an Approve recommendation, the lender must determine the accuracy and completeness of the tradeline information. If the borrower is responsible and the information accurately and completely reports the account, then the lender may manually underwrite the loan if it is eligible. Tradelines reported as medical debt will continue to be excluded from the disputed tradeline identification and lenders are not required to investigate disputes. DU is regularly reviewed to determine if its risk analysis is appropriate. Version 10.1 will include an update to this risk assessment and it is expected to increase the percentage of Approve/Eligible recommendations received by lenders, particularly those with DTI rations between 45 and 50 percent.

The new DU version will also contain changes in or will generate new messages about underwriting issues in the following areas:

Income and Employment Updates Property Inspection Waivers Student Loan Cash-Out Refinance Employment Offers Multiple Financed Properties Site Condo Reviews Timeshares Homebuyer Education.

Version 10.1 will also support the final Consumer Financial Protection Bureau rule implementing amendments to the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) which modified the reportable data requirements related to collection of information of borrower ethnicity, race, and gender.

Fannie Mae says that with the release of the DU Version 10.1, Version 9.3 will be retired . Effective the weekend of July 29, resubmissions of loan casefiles to the old version will not be accepted although applications and Underwriting Findings reports will still be available for viewing. To obtain an updated underwriting recommendation after the retirement date customers must create a new loan casefile.

Three Approaches.

Valuation Matters From the Minds of Designated Appraisers.

Tagged with Fannie Mae.

The Uniform Appraisal Dataset.

This article first appeared in Appraisal Today. Thank you Ann O’Rourke for publishing!

The Uniform Appraisal Dataset (UAD) was designed to help bring some uniformity into the appraisal process related to mortgage work. After all, appraisers were not very uniform in the way they described condition and quality. This applied not just to condition and quality ratings, but to a myriad of other factors such as view and location, down to how basement finish was identified. The Collateral Underwriter (CU) was designed in part to synthesize all of this information and also to identify areas where appraisers differed markedly from each other, as well as even within their own work product.

We had a lot of angst at the outset of CU related to reusing quality and condition ratings, and possibly changing them from one report to another. This was a valid concern because it is one of the factors that does get measured within the CU. Since the UAD has been required since 2011 for mortgage related work intended for Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac, we would expect, five years after the fact, that appraisers would be well versed with what the specific ratings entailed. As both a reviewer and appraiser in the field, I find this is unfortunately far from the truth. The truth seems to be, that confusion related to the requirements is still rampant, and my contention is, that it is not the appraisers who are at fault, but the definitions themselves. There are simply too many grey areas. Either that, or education has not been sufficient in helping appraisers understand what is expected. It is a good possibility however, based on the continued widespread variances, that the definitions themselves are too vague.

Let us take a look at quality for a Q4 and a Q5 house. The ratings in the 1004 form show:

Q4 Dwellings with this quality rating meet or exceed the requirements of applicable building codes. Standard or modified standard building plans are utilized and the design includes adequate fenestration and some exterior ornamentation and interior refinements. Materials, workmanship, finish, and equipment are of stock or builder grade and may feature some upgrades.

Q5 Dwellings with this quality rating feature economy of construction and basic functionality as main considerations. Such dwellings feature a plain design using readily available or basic floor plans featuring minimal fenestration and basic finishes with minimal exterior ornamentation and limited interior detail. These dwellings meet minimum building codes and are constructed with inexpensive, stock materials with limited refinements and upgrades.

Q4 indicates stock builder grade and may feature some upgrades. Q5 indicates basic finishes and inexpensive, stock materials with limited refinements and upgrades. Both say stock, but Q4 says it may feature some upgrades. What are these upgrades? Are they upgrades to cabinetry, or are they upgrades to the building itself? Does taking a standard high-volume production build quality for the starter market, but adding higher-end cabinetry bump the quality level up?

What about condition? Probably the two ratings that are utilized the most are C3 and C4, which are as follows:

C3 The improvements are well maintained and feature limited physical depreciation due to normal wear and tear. Some components, but not every major building component, may be updated or recently rehabilitated. The structure has been well maintained.

*Note: The improvement is in its first-cycle of replacing short-lived building components (appliances, floor coverings, HVAC, etc.) and is being well maintained. Its estimated effective age is less than its actual age. It also may reflect a property in which the majority of short-lived building components have been replaced but not to the level of a complete renovation.

C4 The improvements feature some minor deferred maintenance and physical deterioration due to normal wear and tear. The dwelling has been adequately maintained and requires only minimal repairs to building components/mechanical systems and cosmetic repairs. All major building components have been adequately maintained and are functionally adequate.

*Note: The estimated effective age may be close to or equal to its actual age. It reflects a property in which some of the short-lived building components have been replaced, and some short-lived building components are at or near the end of their physical life expectancy; however, they still function adequately. Most minor repairs have been addressed on an ongoing basis resulting in an adequately maintained property.

Given the scenario that follows, the C3 and C4 ratings are most likely in play, and the difference between the two are that on C3, that some components may be updated or recently rehabilitated and well maintained, and on C4 they are adequately maintained and functionally adequate. What about quality ratings for this same property?

Because this is a question that seems to engender different answers, I asked this question through SurveyMonkey:

If the subject property is a solid Q5 or Q4 production house, but the owners have installed a new high quality kitchen and bathrooms, does the quality rating change?

Figure about a 10-year old house and all sales were built the same initially.

I purposely limited the responses to three choices because I did not want to get too many options, or otherwise there would be little consensus from the respondents. The choices included 1) that recently installed new high-quality kitchen and bathroom changed the quality, 2) that it did not change the quality but changed condition, and 3) that it did not change quality but was addressed as a line item adjustment. At this writing, there were 442 responses, which is more than sufficient to have a good sense of appraiser’s opinions.

20.36% of the respondents considered it an upgrade of quality.

54.52% considered it a condition rating change.

25.11% considered it a line item adjustment.

In essence, 79% of the respondents considered it did not change quality but was either a condition change, or warranted a separate line-item adjustment.

So, what is the answer?

Strictly speaking, the UAD language indicates it is a change of quality, but in the minds of appraisers and/or users, is it? If “once a manufactured home, always a manufactured home” is true, how does swapping out a higher quality kitchen and/or bathroom from stock raise the quality of the whole house? How does changing a kitchen and bathrooms affect the structure of the house? Does it do anything other than change condition? If it is condition, how is this different than installing a new kitchen and bathrooms of stock quality in the stock quality house? Would it be best addressed as a condition item, but also as a line item because one aspect of the house is now atypical for the quality of the typical house by this production builder?

I do not have the answers, throw this out for discussion, because as proposed at the beginning of this article, the UAD ratings are too vague, and open to interpretation. Perhaps now is the time to drill down to what is truly expected within the various ratings and start a discussion on how upgrades to some non-structural elements to a house could, or could not, affect the overall quality rating of the building. Hopefully this brief article spurs on discussion of these ratings, and helps ferment more consistency between appraisers who do mortgage related work, since we are all judged by the actions of our peers in our market and we want to be judged fairly.

As in all things appraisal, when in doubt, disclose. Write more, explain more. It certainly helps mitigate those grey areas to inform the intended users why one condition or quality rating was chosen over the other options.

I have Google Earth and know how to use it.

This post was originally published in Appraisal Today magazine and is republished with permission.

I have Google Earth and know how to use it.

Seriously though, as a reviewer, it is one of the first tools I reach for when I look up the property that is the subject of the appraisal I am reviewing. Assume all reviewers do. We use it to make sure that the property does not back up to, side against, or face some type of externality such as a major 8-lane freeway, massive shopping mall or toxic waste facility. Hopefully the appraisal that has one of these externalities addresses it. Sometimes the appraisals go to great length to discuss externalities and any effect on marketability and value. Sometimes there is a sentence or two. Sometimes crickets.

Yesterday I pulled up GE on the house that was the subject of an appraisal I was reviewing and it backed up to a bunch of buildings. Looked possibly to be a school, but the street view maps took me around the side and to the entrance of what turned out to be a large condominium complex. Absolutely no big deal, but there wasn’t one single word related to this in the appraisal. I asked a group of appraisers whether they would make a comment if their subject property backed up to a condominium complex, and the responses ran the gamut from “of course”, to “no way, it is already covered in the neighborhood check boxes”.

While the check boxes for the neighborhood include multi-family, they do not include condominium, and in this instance, there was nothing in the appraisal even hinting that there was a mixture of single-unit uses in the area. This property didn’t raise a red-flag insomuch as backing to a freeway, commercial shopping center or toxic waste facility, but it did raise a question and warranted a bit more research. This is fine as it part of my job, but as someone who actually reads the reports in front of me, I was just left confused as to why it wasn’t even mentioned. I was even more confused by why so many appraisers say that it is not worth mentioning.

Maybe it is being old fashioned, but I grew up with the understanding that an appraiser was the eyes and the ears of the client, and that anything that would likely raise a question for the client should be addressed. Of course the freeway, mall and toxic waste facility are givens, but wouldn’t anything that was literally in the backyard also be something that would get questioned? How many minutes does it take out of the process to write a few sentences about a condominium complex? Couldn’t it be as simple as saying “The subject backs up to the XYZ condominium complex and has a seasonal view of some of these buildings. There is no negative effect on marketability or value of the subject property related to its location adjacent to this residential use” or some such rot?

While it is easy to overlook potential concerns due to the amount of reporting we have to do (and remember, there is no such thing as a perfect appraisal), stepping into the mind of the client and asking yourself “what would the client be concerned about” is a very useful exercise. While the client may not care about the house backing to a condominium complex because it is a residential use like the subject, they may care about it backing to the complex if for some reason it does affect marketability and/or value. It is up to us, as appraisers, to report and analyze what it is we see, and although we can never catch every little thing, our value is partly measured by our ability to communicate and to analyze these nuances.

Remember, reviewers have Google Earth and other tools at their fingertips, and most use them.

One simple extraction.

I just fielded a call from a potential client who was curious about how an appraiser would go about extracting an adjustment from the market, in this case specifically basement finish. In the discussion I explained that there is no factor that appraisers use, but that we turn to the market to try and show us what buyers are paying. Because different markets can act quite differently, I thought putting up a couple of examples of this type of extraction might be useful, both to my potential client, as well as my audience in general. The following show two different examples of an extraction for basement finish, one in Ann Arbor related to a generally newer house in the $400,000 or so price range, and the other in Lincoln school district in the under $200,000 price range. Both use the same methodology and both show substantial differences in final results, which is why an appraiser cannot just provide a number. Instead the appraiser has to look at the market. The first sample I went back two years and narrowed my market data to houses between 2000 and 3000 sqft, built between 1990-2010 on the west side of Ann Arbor (used areas 82, 83, and 84) and then downloaded all these sales to Excel and segmented the sales between houses with finished basements and without. The results were 37 sales without finished basements and 62 identified with finished basements. I looked at median and average sales price differences and median and average amount of basement finish, and came up with between $21,647 and $24,500 difference in price favoring those with the basement finish, and between $24.24 per sqft and $27.75 per sqft of basement finish. This provided me with some support for my adjustment. I don’t recall what my adjustment was, but I think anywhere between $20,000 and $25,000 is supported based on this data. That and in my experience, basements in this area cost about $40 per sqft to actually finish. Here is what it looks like on a spreadsheet: The next example is using sales in the Lincoln school district, and in this one my isolated properties were between 1,200 – 1,700 sqft in size and built between 1985-2010, also going back two years. I had 48 sales without basement finish and 36 with basement finish, and the median difference in price was $8,953 and the average price difference was $14,420. The median size of finish was 625 sqft and the average size of finish was 703 sqft, supporting adjustments per sqft of $14.32 to $20.51. As you can see, there are differences in price between the areas and the sizes, as would be expected. Cost remains about the same to complete. Each appraisal may be different, and the numbers found here in these two samples could change depending on how far back the appraiser goes on their data research and what they set as the perimeters for the data search. I offer this to you, my readers, as a simple study showing how I often go about trying to extract an adjustment from the market. A final word of caution; I would not expect to see an appraiser put this analysis into their appraisal. They will likely do it, and say something in the report about the adjustment being analyzed through market data. This is what they likely mean, but won’t put the actual results into the report, instead they will have it in their files, be it in the office in general, or specific to an appraisal they were working on. Hope you all enjoyed this simple explanation, and if you have questions about appraisals and appraisal processes, please feel free to contact me. Easiest way to reach me is via email at rach mass at comcast dot net.

CU and Me: Let’s Be Practical For A Moment - Part 2.

Editorial by Woody Fincham, SRA.

Over the next several days I will be posting up my thoughts on the recent Fannie Mae Lender Letter Lender Letter LL-2015-02. This is part 2. Part 1 is here.

So let us dive in to looking at that Lender Letter. Each of the quoted sections comes from the Lender Letter, which is cited above this. Following each are my thoughts on the quoted section.

“CU does not accept or reject appraisal reports or characterize an appraisal as “good” or “bad.” The CU risk score and messages pertain to risk and identify potential defects in the appraisal report. The lender is not obligated to “clear” or “override” the CU messages. The messages are meant to be used as red flag messages that lenders should use to assist with their appraisal analysis and inform their decisions based on a complete analysis and understanding of the appraisal report. [1] ”

I think this clarifies some of the biggest concerns to what CU is and is not. Most large lenders and appraisal management companies (AMCs) have been using all sorts of third-party review rule sets and data pools for many years. So this is nothing new under the sun. It really is the first time they are pulling in data that is verified by appraisers. It has the potential to be a good thing, but it could very well be a bad thing. It will depend on how the lenders use it in their respective review processes. It is certainly bad for appraisers if they approach it the same way that they approached the 15% and 25% adjustment guidelines. I will not get into the old adjustment guidelines to deeply yet, but we all know that many lenders were set in stone about the 15% and 25% guidelines when Fannie Mae was not. Yet lenders and AMCs still required adherence to those guidelines in some cases as hard and fast rules.

Working in a market as I do in Charlottesville, VA I understand where some concern would come from in the appraisal community. Much of my personal work involves complex residential assignments. From what I gather from those I have spoken to at Fannie Mae, and what information I have read about CU, I imagine many of my reports will become a four or five in their system. I deal with properties that require regional research because they are status homes: essentially unique and custom to the market. I would assume that these types of properties represent less than 5% of that MSA, and transfer infrequently. The market is also small on the urban-side and voluminous in the rural and transition from suburban to rural type properties; acreage varies greatly. The fact the MSA is in the Appalachian Mountains and that Fannie Mae requires segregation of finished basements from above grade living area; an overwhelming number of homes are built on slopes that have basements. I think you see that unless I am in a planned neighborhood or condominium development, it is unlikely my work product can be seen as conforming. By circumstance, these properties will rate high in risk.

If I felt like my ability to perform work would be affected by the CU rick scores, then I would be up in arms as well. Many of my colleagues believe that the CU risk score will affect them. While I cannot say that it will (or will not), if AMCs/lenders decide to use the information to benchmark appraiser quality it could be a nightmare for some appraisers. When you get to my thoughts on the 15% and 25% adjustment guidelines, later in this piece you will see more of my perspective on this. I could be wrong, but I am not going to be overly concerned… ainda. Until I see things happen contrary to Fannie Mae’s stated position, I will defer on an alarmist attitude.

“CU does not provide an estimate of value to the lender. CU provides a numerical risk score from 1.0 to 5.0, with one indicating the lowest risk and five indicating the highest risk. Risk flags and messages identify risk factors and specific aspects of the appraisal that may require further attention.”

I know many appraisers were convinced that this was not the case. Many were positive that Fannie Mae was going to assign scores to the individual appraisers. It is easy to see why that would be a concern, as the last major Fannie Mae policy change dealt with the Uniform Appraisal Dataset (UAD). Appraisers are directly monitored on consistency of data for comparables with the UAD, but not with CU.

It is easy to mix it all up. If you submit data in violation to their UAD standards, that does affect you. The CU rating score does not. It is relative to the report itself, not to the appraiser. With that stated, AMCs and lenders COULD use consistent high-risk scores on reports as a means to stratify appraisers as problematic from those that get lower ratings. If this type of comparison was made a tracked, it could affect me. I do not compete with the typical mortgage-use appraisers in my market. Plenty stay in homogenous subdivisions and I cannot do the work that they do at the price points they do them. If their resulting reports are lower-risk scores by the nature of the conformity these properties present versus the types of properties that I typically work with, I will be seen as an inferior appraiser. Fannie Mae may state their position on such things but that does not mean the lenders and AMCs will not distill and extend the information they see further.

This is getting into the realm of conjecture; as such, there is not a whole lot of merit to it at all. It does make one stop and ask questions though. I try not to worry about things that I cannot control so I will leave such thoughts alone for now. But I will come back to the way lenders took the 15% and 25% adjustment guidelines out of context and altered the profession. I will have some more on that later, of course.

“CU’s selection of comparable sales considers the relevance of each potential comparable sale based on physical similarity, time, and distance. The selection process is not based on the relative “risk” or sale price of a comparable sale nor is there a “lower is best” approach. In fact, CU may assign a high risk score to an appraisal when the model identifies alternative sales that are potentially more relevant than the comparable sales used by the appraiser, regardless of whether the alternative sales are higher or lower in price.”

This certainly is concerning for appraisers. Appraisers are paid to perform the research and when we do it, we can get defensive about someone questioning it. Call it professional pride, but this can be a catalyst to incite negativity among us quickly. It is probably a good idea that appraisers write their reports with the above in mind. Part of this may be addressed by including commentary regarding ideal and typical improvements for the shared competing market.

Since the risk flags are triggered by not using properties that are more similar on paper, commentary may need to change to deal with these items in mind. Canned commentary certainly will not work in many situations. I know this means taking the time to write custom commentary in every report, but with enough foresight, it is easy enough to build a template that is set up as a skeleton to which specific report comments can be added. I have also suggested to a few colleagues, when asked, that they approach this similar to ERC (employee relocation) reporting. Possibly embedding a chart of all the comparables surveyed from MLS prior to distilling then down to the comparables in the actual report. I realize this is more work, but if we start seeing lots of kickbacks on this issue, this might be a way to avoid it.

The way CU is setup, at least how it has been explained thus far, is that data is stratified by census block groups (CBG), which goes into the next quote…

“CU takes location into account using Census Block Group levels, which are subsets of Census Tracts. This is the most viable proxy for location in the absence of standardized neighborhood definitions, and more effective than use of arbitrary distance guidelines. Fannie Mae is not suggesting that appraisers use Census Block Groups to define comparable search areas, but appraisers remain responsible for indicating when comparables are from outside of the subject neighborhood and for addressing any differences.”

This has caused quite the banter in social media appraisal groups and pages. There are all kinds of issues with this concept. The most obvious one is that appraisers do not stratify by CBGs normally. It would be great if the software companies could create or add a way to also tag which CBGs each comparable comes from or address it in the rules set reviewer in each of the form packages. This would at least allow a streamlined tool to allow the appraisers to comment on this item. Perhaps even a data point that could appear in MLS data. Most addresses are geo-coded now, so it would be an assumingly easy thing to do by over laying the CBG maps to existing maps.

Obviously, Fannie Mae chose this methodology because neighborhoods will vary market to market. My concern with it comes from the staff reviewers at lenders and AMCs (Quality Control or QC Staff) that are not familiar geographically (geo competency) with the area. This certainly gets back to USPAP regarding writing the report at level commensurate to the intended users. Explain away would the obvious answer, but that also require the readers and QC Staff to read the reports thoroughly. I often hear from folks involved in QC review that they prefer cogent writing and brevity. From some of the reviews I have personally gotten from lower-level QC staff (unlicensed appraisers); it seems many struggle with common terms in real property economics. I struggle with dealing with those that gloss over when I use terms such as linkage, commercial zones, obsolescence, etc.

This also still sets up the appraisers to deal with non-appraisers applying arbitrary guidelines. While distance guidelines are now going to be relaxed, in their stead I dread the likely possibility that QC Staff will want CBG differences addressed. A bit later, I will address the sun setting of the 15% and 25% adjustment guidelines, but one has to see the possible pitfalls with CBGs that the lender-leveraged adjustment guidelines created. QC staffs need to be well trained to deal with this. Nothing prevents individual lenders and AMCs from requiring more than Fannie Mae’s suggestion as to how to implement the CU into their work processes.

“The risk analysis performed by CU is for exclusive use by the lender in their analysis of the appraisal report. After completing a thorough review, a lender should be able to have constructive dialogue with the appraiser to resolve specific appraisal questions or concerns. Although the lender may use output from Collateral Underwriter to inform its dialogue with appraisal management companies and appraisers regarding appraisals they supplied, the CU license terms prohibit providing these entities with copies or displays of Fannie Mae reports that contain CU findings, including without limitation the CU Print Report, the UCDP Submission Summary Report, or any other CU report. The lender must not make demands or provide instructions to the appraiser based solely on automated feedback. Also, the CU license terms prohibit using it “in a manner that interferes with the independent judgment of an appraiser.” Fannie Mae expects the lender to use human due diligence in combination with the CU feedback, and will actively follow up with lenders who are reported to be asking appraisers to change their reports based on CU feedback without any further due diligence.”

Fannie Mae is pretty clear the impetus is not to strong-arm appraisers with the feedback and analysis done by the system. There is a real desire to keep human beings in the mix from Fannie Mae’s side. The possible disconnect I see will be on the competency of the QC Staff. The way many AMCs and lenders approach QC reviews is by hiring unlicensed staff people and expecting them to understand what valuation professionals do. Each appraisal is different and finding comments buried in a 20-50 page report is arduous at best; I can struggle with it and I have performed hundreds if not well over a thousand reviews in my career. The tactic that most QC staff uses now is simply kick to out a report because they cannot find a comment, or how the appraiser addresses the issues up front, and rely on the appraiser to point it out. There are already copious examples of appraisers stating they are often already addressed in the original report. Unless there is some reengineering of the process, this will only get worse as now the QC Staffs will be armed with more data.

One thing that we have already seen from CU is the copying CU comments being sent to the appraisers. I have seen several examples from colleagues where something was flagged in CU and no human review was done. No dialogue was attempted between the QC staff and the affected appraiser. Fannie Mae has made it clear that the CU scores and flags are meant to be dealt with by QC staff actually having dialogue with the appraiser. Instead, what we are seeing so far is many QC Staff people are simply copying and pasting CU comments and sending them as a standalone engagement for revision or commentary for the appraiser to deal with. That is not creating dialogue; it is asking the appraiser to the work for the QC Staff. One would think, after reading Fannie Mae’s letter that the expectation is for the QC Staff to check the report in question before calling on the appraiser to do anything. If the appraiser has reasonably commented or dealt with the issues of concern, they should be good to go.

Much of this is going to remain an issue with AMCs and lenders that continue to utilize the services of uneducated and undertrained QC Staff. Large lenders and AMCs that process lots of volume expect an awful lot of their QC Staff. Each appraisal, if written well, is stand-alone research project. It should be read and understood with the same care it was prepared. Pulling in someone that has never read an appraisal report as an hourly reviewer and expect them to get through the jargon and concepts that are summarized in a mortgage use report is counter-intuitive. Either the Lenders or AMCs need to start hiring competent and credentialed valuation professionals, or spend the resources needed to train raw talent. Both aspects are expensive, and neither is an option with the current compensation structures in the mortgage and valuation overlap of space. We will certainly discuss fee levels in depth a bit later.

“Fannie Mae does not instruct or suggest to lenders that they ask the appraiser to address all or any of the 20 comparables that are provided by CU for most appraisals. It is also not Fannie Mae’s expectation that appraisals should contain only CU’s top-ranked comparable sales. In the majority of cases, there may be no material difference between comparable sales utilized by the appraiser and those identified by CU. Before asking the appraiser to consider any alternative sales, it is imperative that the lender analyze the relevance of the sale and determine if the use of such sale would result in any material change to the appraisal report. If the lender determines that there would be no material change, then they should not ask the appraiser to make revisions. Fannie Mae expects CU to enable lenders to accept appraisals “as is” with greater confidence.”

The previous comments I have made are applicable here, too. The disconnect lenders had, again the adjustment ratio guidelines come to mind immediately, understandably make appraisers wince at this idea. The biggest concern, here again, is that QC Staff must be at a level of competency to understand that suggested comparable sales are just that, suggestions. The way this was handled pre-CU was to send an appraiser comparable sales that were not used and ask the appraiser to then comment on not using them or to possibly also include them. Of course, the comedy often ensues when the appraiser replies back that, “Two of the three comparables you sent me to consider are already in the report.” This type of real world scenario proves that where Fannie Mae may need to concentrate some of this reengineering of the process is on those that do review and QC work.

Not to plug the Appraisal Institute (AI), but this may be the very reason that the AI created the new review designations, AI-GRS and AI-RRS. Review is a completely different animal than Standard-1 and Standard-2 reporting. I understand that hiring such professionals is a higher cost, which means more cost to the consumer, but let us face it; you get what you pay for. At the very least, if the lenders want to have a positive outcome from the QC side, it should be built around utilizing well-trained professionals and the review designations are a step in the right direction in my opinion. And it really may not need to be at the consumer’s dime so much as maybe it should come from the lenders. The last I looked the larger lenders have no problems posting profit reports.

I spoke with a chief appraiser with a major AMC last week. He informed me that they have three levels of human reviewers. The first level is a combination of using technology to flag potential issues and areas that may need more in depth analysis. If there is enough need to elevate it upwards, it is then looked at by a non-licensed staff person. On the next and final level, a human being that is licensed is involved. It is apparently an effective way to do things, but even their internal processes still leave some room for improvement. When so much volume is handled by any given entity, and cost is always the biggest concern, it is impossible to hire but so much real talent. I will come back to cost a little later when I discuss fees and compensation.

Stay tuned more to come over the next week. If you have any suggestions or want to share some war stories, please send them over to woody@woodyfincham.

CU and Me: Let’s Be Practical For A Moment - Part1.

Editorial by Woody Fincham, SRA.

Over the next several days I will be posting up my thoughts on the recent Fannie Mae Lender Letter Lender Letter LL-2015-02. This is part 1.

On February 4, 2015, Fannie Mae released a new Lender Letter[1]. This was a full week and two days after they kicked off the Collateral Underwriter (CU). Many things in the residential valuation profession can create a stir, but few things create quite the clamor that a major government sponsored entity (GSE) policy change creates. I helped co-write[2] an article on depreciated cost to support adjustments last week. As always, there are interesting comments on anything that gets published in our profession. Most have been very supportive, a few less so.

In the comments for that article, a pro-appraiser commenter was defensive of appraisers regarding the balance of how much work that can be done at such low fees for the mortgage clients. His supposition is that the topic of the article was great but that appraisers could not possibly be expected to do that much work for the fee levels that are so common in the profession. I share that empathy for fee appraisers. I truly do. I came up through the fee side of things, it is in my DNA and I will forever think of myself as an appraiser from that light.

I also share in the reality that some of my colleagues in the residential mortgage space are not doing much of anything to support adjustments. Many have relied on “professional judgment” and “experience” when it comes to addressing adjustments, and sometimes that is offered in lieu of actual support. I agree that both of these things have some merit, but often they are used in lieu of doing deductive research to support how much something is adjusted for in the grid. They both can work when it comes to knowing something should be adjusted or not, but how much is sometimes thumb nailed or otherwise guessed at with no real support. Before that sets off a bunch of personal barbs towards me, if you are doing your job in a manner that you are happy with, then keep doing that.

Of course if someone is reading this and my comments offend you because you do not support your adjustments; please be aware that my intention was/is not to do so. I tend to be a bit of a purist when it comes to developing and reporting valuation services and that is for me and those that I manage. What works for you is between you and the USPAP police.

I realize as a businessperson, there has to be a sweet spot between quality, speed and price. That can be a hard thing to figure out. If you focus on speed too much, quality tends to decrease. The same is true of price, if you can only get a low fee for your work; it becomes more difficult for some to rationalize not cutting corners to do it for less money. If you focus on writing a demonstration-quality report each time out of the gate, you will go broke because you take too much time and if you charge at a commensurate level, you cannot be but so competitive. Balance is key in this space, and it will vary from practice to practice and market to market.

When we wrote that piece, it was a suggestion to ferret out support by using something many of us are familiar with but may have not used in a while. It was also written to introduce the topic to folks that have never used it or thought to use it. This approach was offered in because many colleagues were being pushed towards alternatives that are being sold as expensive “wonder approaches”. Rather than seeing honest people buy a bag of magic beans, we offered another less expensive alternative. So the article was written with empathy towards fee appraisers.

So as these few pieces roll out over the next few days, I hope that my perspective adds some food for thought. This is certainly not an attack piece on Fannie Mae. Fannie Mae work is an important part of residential valuation, one that is much too big to shrug off and say, “Well, smart appraisers shouldn’t do lender work.” This sentiment is simply not possible for everyone, and we need to all voice our concerns for all of our colleagues in the profession. Residential lending work is a lucrative part of the valuation profession, a low hanging fruit if you will.

This will also not be an attack piece on AMCs as they serve a function to our mutual clients. Whether we like or dislike AMCs, they are here and will remain a part of the landscape for the foreseeable future. Instead of wallowing in the pig pen of discontent, we need to figure out how to make the best of the situation. There has to be some sort of symbiosis attainable, so that everyone can get what they need and can reasonably attain some of what everyone wants. What I hope this is seen as is a common sense observation based on how all three entities, appraisers, AMCs and lenders can coexist. No one has the perfect answer but I hope this might add some positive discourse.

Stay tuned more to come over the next week. If you have any suggestions or want to share some war stories, please send them over to woody@woodyfincham.

[2] Rachel Massey, Woody Fincham, and Timothy Andersen, “Depreciated Cost, a Test of Reasonableness,”

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Letter from Our CEO 1 Focusing on Our Customers 2 Reimagining America’s Way Home 3 Building Toward the Future 4 Serving People in Need 5 Recognized by the Industry 6 Join the Conversation.

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We work at the heart of housing, providing financing to create housing opportunities across the nation. Our vision is to be America’s most valued housing partner.

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In 2016, America’s housing market continued to grow stronger. Serving this market and helping meet its challenges are what drive the people who work at Fannie Mae. Our story is on the pages that follow.

To us, Fannie Mae’s job is not housing. It is homes.

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The spirit of home breathes life into all facets of our work. Guided by this spirit, Fannie Mae has become a vastly different company. We have put in place strong, sensible lending standards, improved our business model, reduced taxpayer exposure, and made mortgage lending simpler and more efficient. Our goal is better outcomes for everyone who contributes to and counts on the safety, efficiency, and agility of the nation’s mortgage market.

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We work to earn our customers’ business, loyalty, and satisfaction every day.

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We believe in the power of simplicity, innovation, and partnership to drive a better housing system. By introducing Day 1 Certainty™, we’re bringing greater speed and clarity to lenders and borrowers–and setting a new standard for lending in America. We have given lenders tools to validate key data about borrower income and assets, as well as home value.

Day 1 Certainty enables lenders to streamline the way they create mortgages. It empowers our customers to grow their business and meet market demands. Now, lenders can deliver more loans faster without sacrificing quality, allowing them to lend with confidence to qualified borrowers and provide borrowers with a better customer experience.

Launched in 2016, Fannie Mae’s Day 1 Certainty is transforming the way mortgages are made and giving lenders the tools to do more business.

It means greater speed, by making the process of creating loans faster and more efficient. It means more simplicity, through automated steps and reduced paper-dependency.

It also means less risk and greater certainty that when a lender sells a loan to Fannie Mae, it stays sold.

We believe Day 1 Certainty will reshape the housing system through improved loan quality, stronger risk management, and more digitization. Taken together, Day 1 Certainty gives lenders the ability to reimagine and improve the experience they can provide to their customers–starting from day one.

“This is a win-win, as the customer’s experience is improved through reduced documentation and accelerated closing dates, while we receive freedom from reps and warrants and operational efficiencies. ” – Glenn Brunker, President, BOK Financial.

Investing in innovation to meet America’s housing needs.

Our lenders demand innovation. They are looking for new solutions that will make doing business simpler and more efficient. And borrowers’ expectations about the ease and speed of the mortgage experience are growing.

Fannie Mae provides fully integrated online tools that are helping lenders reimagine what it means to create a mortgage. We are introducing new options, such as our flexible HomeReadyВ® mortgage, to expand affordable lending opportunties for creditworthy borrowers. We are investing in improved capabilities, including Day 1 Certainty and the use of trended credit data in our Desktop UnderwriterВ® platform, to provide lenders with better insight. And we are partnering with FinTech companies to help the industry bring the digital mortgage closer to reality.

From unique loan flexibilities that address changing demographics to groundbreaking technologies that streamline the home-buying process, we are redefining the way America does housing and mortgage finance.

Helping Homeowners with Student Debt.

In 2016, we launched a cash-out refinance option for student loan debt. With Student Loan Payoff Refi, homeowners can pay off student debt using the equity in their homes. And by consolidating remaining student and mortgage debt into one loan, consumers can benefit from comparatively low mortgage rates.

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In just over three years, Fannie Mae has created attractive new markets to transfer mortgage credit risk to private investors, protecting America’s taxpayers. Before, when we bought or securitized mortgages for single-family homes, we acquired and held on to the credit risk. Now, we distribute some of the risk through our capital markets and reinsurance transactions. We use industry-leading innovations to manage credit risk through the entire life cycle of the loan. These capabilities make our credit risk transfer transactions attractive to investors, enhancing our ability to facilitate the flow of private capital throughout the market.

Single-Family Loans Covered by Credit Risk Transfer Transactions As of year-end 2016, nearly one-quarter of the loans in our single-family conventional guaranty book of business were included in a reference pool for a credit risk transfer transaction.

For more information on our credit risk transfer transactions, including information on the portion of the credit risk of these loans we have transferred, refer to our 2016 Form 10-K.

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Manufactured Housing Communities have been a vital part of America’s housing stock for several decades. Today, they are an increasingly attractive option for families seeking affordable and safe places to call home.

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In 2016, we announced our largest-ever Manufactured Housing Communities transaction, which will offer workforce housing for more than 29,000 families across the country. We worked with KeyBank National Association and Wells Fargo Multifamily Capital to provide financing to YES! Communities, LLC. Taking a unique approach to managing its properties, YES! encourages a sense of community for residents.

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With our affordable green financing options, the owners of apartment buildings and cooperatives can make energy - and water-saving improvements that reduce their properties’ environmental impact. These investments also improve a property’s bottom line through lower utility costs—with potential savings for both building owners and renters.

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We are building on 80 years of experience and expertise to meet the future needs of home buyers and renters across America. Working closely with lenders, servicers, industry partners, and the Federal Housing Finance Agency, we’re creating a stronger, smarter, better mortgage finance system–one that continues to create affordable, sustainable home opportunities.

We Are Where People Are In 2016, we provided $637 billion in mortgage financing across the country, enabling 1.1 million home purchases, 1.4 million mortgage refinancings, and 724,000 units of affordable rental housing.

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We don’t just want to help families get into homes–we want to help them stay there. The first step is making sure buyers only take on mortgages they can afford.

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Strong Credit Performance. As of December 31, 2016, the share of single-family loans in our book of business that are seriously delinquent has dropped for 27 consecutive quarters.

. And a Strong Book of Business Single-family conventional loans acquired since 2009 vs. 2008 and earlier Single-family conventional guaranty book of business as of December 31, 2016.

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Characteristics of Our Single-Family Loans Single-family conventional guaranty book of business as of December 31, 2016.

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At Fannie Mae, everything we do is designed to strengthen America’s housing industry and build stronger communities. Making it easy for our employees to contribute to the communities where they live and work is an important part of that mission.

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We are glad that respected organizations have recognized the work we’re doing to improve our business. The awards we received in 2016 reflect our talents, expertise, and achievements in building a better housing finance system.

Our employees work tirelessly to ensure access to affordable financing opportunities for homeowners, homebuyers, and renters in all market conditions. Our teams have been recognized for leadership in workplace diversity, energy efficiency, technology, and more. We are making a difference, thanks to the deep commitment of our people.

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Visit Fannie Mae’s HomePath website to find Fannie Mae-owned properties for sale. Connect with us on Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and Pinterest.

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Fannie Mae’s Know Your Options website is your one-stop resource for housing education and foreclosure-prevention support. Connect with us on Facebook and Twitter.

Published May 4, 2017.

For more information on our business, including information on our recent financial results and credit performance, the credit profile of our book of business, and significant risks relating to our business, see our annual report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2016, filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on February 17, 2017 (“2016 Form 10-K”).

This report includes our expectations regarding the focus of our business and the impact of our actions on our business and the U. S. housing finance system. These expectations are forward-looking statements based on our current assumptions regarding numerous factors. Our actual results and future expectations may differ materially from our current expectations as a result of many factors, including those discussed in the “Risk Factors” and “Forward-Looking Statements” sections of and elsewhere in our 2016 Form 10-K. These forward-looking statements are representative only as of the date they are made, and we undertake no obligation to update any forward-looking statement as a result of new information, future events, or otherwise, except as required under the federal securities laws.

Data in this report as of or through December 31, 2016, unless otherwise indicated.

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Compare com Benchmark: Serviços Financeiros da DJIA S & P 500 GLOBAL DOW NASDAQ.

Open 1.67 Prior Close 1.6988 (02/20/18) 1 Day FNMA 3.02% DJIA -0.67% S&P Mid Cap 400 -0.22% Financial Services -0.07%

News Fannie Mae FNMA.

18 hours ago MarketWatch Fannie and Freddie aren’t broken, so stop tinkering, Pimco tells Congress MarketWatch 02/20/18 The Wall Street Journal Supreme Court Declines to Wade Into Fight Over Fannie, Freddie Profits The Wall Street Journal 02/16/18 MarketWatch Fannie Mae to turn to taxpayers after $6.5 billion loss MarketWatch 02/15/18 The Wall Street Journal Another Plea From Fannie Mae The Wall Street Journal 02/14/18 The Wall Street Journal Fannie Mae to Require $3.7 Billion Government Cash Infusion The Wall Street Journal 02/14/18 Press Release Fannie Mae Reports Fourth Quarter and Full-Year 2017 Financial Results Press Release 02/13/18 MarketWatch Washington is budgeting a $5.1 billion taxpayer bailout for Fannie and Freddie MarketWatch 02/13/18 Press Release Fannie Mae Announces Sale of Non-Performing Loans Press Release 02/07/18 Press Release Fannie Mae Announces Scheduled Release of Fourth Quarter and Full-Year 2017 Financial Results Press Release 02/05/18 Press Release Fannie Mae Announces $100 Million Low-Income Housing Tax Credit Fund Press Release 01/31/18 Press Release Fannie Mae Releases December 2017 Monthly Summary Press Release 01/31/18 The Wall Street Journal Housing Policy Didn’t Cause the 2007 Crash The Wall Street Journal 01/25/18 Press Release Fannie Mae Multifamily Closes 2017 with Record Volume of More Than $67 Billion Press Release 01/19/18 MarketWatch As Fannie and Freddie reform talk heats up, their regulator speaks up MarketWatch 01/17/18 Press Release Fannie Mae Introduces Enhanced Resident Services as Part of its Healthy Housing Rewards Initiative Press Release 01/16/18 Press Release Fannie Mae Announces Advisory Panel Members for Sustainable Communities Innovation Challenge Press Release 01/08/18 The Wall Street Journal The High Stakes in the Looming Fannie and Freddie Overhaul The Wall Street Journal 01/03/18 Press Release Fannie Mae Connecticut Avenue Securities Receive NAIC Designations for the 2017 Filing Year Press Release 01/03/18 The Wall Street Journal A Fight Over the Credit Score Lenders Use for Your Mortgage The Wall Street Journal 12/22/17 MarketWatch Fannie, Freddie will now keep some capital reserves MarketWatch 12/18/17 Press Release Fannie Mae Issues $10 Million 'Challenge' to Help Address America's Affordable Housing Crisis Press Release 12/18/17 Press Release Fannie Mae Publishes Final Duty to Serve Underserved Markets Plan Press Release 12/11/17 MarketWatch Prospects for housing finance reform ‘brighten’ and may favor shareholders MarketWatch 12/11/17 Press Release Fannie Mae Announces Eviction Moratorium for the Holidays Press Release 12/07/17 Press Release Fannie Mae Leaders Named Among 'Most Powerful' List Press Release 12/06/17 MarketWatch Here’s what else tax reform means: another bailout of Fannie and Freddie MarketWatch 12/04/17 Press Release Fannie Mae Launches DUS Disclose Website Press Release 11/29/17 Press Release Fannie Mae Completes Final Credit Insurance Risk Transfer Transaction of 2017 on $16 Billion of Single-Family Loans Press Release 08/08/17 MarketWatch Fannie and Freddie could need $100 billion bailout in next crisis, stress test finds MarketWatch 08/06/17 MarketWatch Congress wouldn’t do it, so Fannie and Freddie reformed themselves MarketWatch 08/03/17 MarketWatch Bipartisan Senate bill would require Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac to use alternative credit scores MarketWatch 05/18/17 MarketWatch Mnuchin expects Fannie and Freddie to keep sending profits to the U. S. Treasury MarketWatch 05/12/17 MarketWatch Fannie and Freddie are nearly out of money and Washington is getting anxious MarketWatch 05/05/17 MarketWatch Fannie Mae reports $2.8 billion quarterly profit as capital buffers dry up MarketWatch 04/26/17 MarketWatch Housing finance overhaul may be finally in the cards, Mnuchin says MarketWatch.

Principais dados do estoque

P / E Ratio (TTM)

Valor de mercado.

Ações em circulação.

Flutuante Público.

Último dividendo.

Data do Dividendo Ex.

Juros curtos ()

Fluxo de dinheiro das ações.

Competitors FNMA.

Federal Agricultural Mortgage Corp. Cl C.

PennyMac Financial Services Inc. Cl A.

Freddie Mac.

More information on FNMA Competitor Data Provided By: capital cube.

Profile FNMA.

Federal National Mortgage Association is a government-sponsored company, which engages in the provision of liquidity for purchases of homes and financing of multifamily rental housing ang refinancing existing mortgages. It operates through the Single-Family and Multifamily.

3900 Wisconsin Avenue Northwest.

Washington District of Columbia 20016.

Pesquisa & amp; Ratings Fannie Mae FNMA.

Lucro Por Ação, Reais e Estimativas.

Quarterly Annual FNMA will report FY 2018 earnings on false FNMA will report Q1 earnings on false.

Financials Fannie Mae FNMA.

Resultado líquido.

Notas e Provedores de Dados.

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Dados fundamentais da empresa e estimativas de analistas fornecidas pela FactSet. Copyright FactSet Research Systems Inc. Todos os direitos reservados.

Fannie Mae Allows Liquid Assets In Lieu of Income.

In a move to help more borrowers qualify for refinancing, Fannie Mae has released new guidelines governing its Refi Plus program. Borrowers and lenders have expanded alternatives for documenting income. Certain liquid financial reserves will now be accepted as verified income. This alternative will apply to loans where the new payment will increase less than 20 percent. The Refi Plus program is available for Fannie Mae to Fannie Mae refinances. Accepted documentation can come from liquid reserves such as bank accounts, money markets, stock accounts, retirement savings accounts, or certificates of deposit. These assets must be documented with at least one recent statement. The new Selling Guideline also addresses streamlined verification of qualifying rental income for investor owned property. This is great news for families who are struggling with the loss of wage income through unemployment, accepting a new job at lower pay, or entering retirement. Fannie Mae will now accept verified liquid assets equal to 12 months of the new mortgage payment. Fannie Mae introduced the Refi Plus program back in 2009 in conjunction with HARP. It was designed to streamline the process of refinancing by expanding the criteria for eligibility. In some cases, lower FICO score requirements, reduced income documentation and waiver of appraisals are allowed. The goal is to reduce the risk of default on a Fannie Mae mortgage by moving responsible borrowers into an affordable payment structure or shorter term. As the balloon hit the housing industry in the last decade, many homeowners had been forced into riskier interest-only loans or adjustable-rate loans. When you are ready to tackle refinancing, check with a mortgage lender, such as Mortgage Capital Associates, to determine whether you qualify for this new program. It is a great time to take advantage of historically low mortgage rates and restructure your monthly payment.

Mortgage Capital Associates (MCA)

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Author: mcamu.

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You Won't Believe Who Is Joining in the Fight for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.

Some of the most influential civil-rights organizations are asking the Obama administration to end the conservatorship and allow Fannie and Freddie to recapitalize.

For the past several years, Fannie Mae (NASDAQOTH:FNMA) and Freddie Mac 's (NASDAQOTH:FMCC) shareholders have been fighting a legal battle against the U. S. government to try to end the agencies' conservatorship and allow them to recapitalize. While the list of plaintiffs includes several high-profile investors such as Bill Ackman and Bruce Berkowitz, there is a new wave of support for recapitalization from some of the nation's most prominent civil-rights organizations.

Who's joining the fight for Fannie and Freddie?

The letter was sent by the National Community Reinvestment Coalition, or NCRC, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, and the League of United Latin American Citizens.

Why they want the conservatorship to end.

"The affordable housing goals and the products that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac administer and have developed for underserved markets have and continue to play a critical role in housing finance, affecting affordability and access to credit for low - and moderate-income and minority communities," the letter explained.

The groups say they are in favor of housing finance reform, but that the administration's plan to reform the GSEs through legislation doesn't have much of a chance to succeed in the current political climate.

In a separate statement, NCRC CEO and President John Taylor said that winding down and getting rid of the agencies, as many in Congress are proposing, is not the way to fix the housing market. "They can and should be recapitalized; they can and should be fixed," Taylor said.

In a nutshell, what the groups are saying is that there is no other plan to ensure continuation of a fair and accessible mortgage market for all creditworthy groups that has any chance to succeed in Congress. And until such a plan exists, a well-capitalized Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are the best option to ensure that happens.

Investors could win big if the agencies recapitalize.

However, if the lawsuit is successful, or if the Obama administration changes its position on the matter, it could mean a big payday for shareholders. Quão grande? Well, Bill Ackman's Pershing Square did a thorough analysis and concluded that if allowed to fully recapitalize, Fannie and Freddie's common shares could be worth between $23 and $47 -- and that includes the 80% stake the government would be entitled to. As of this writing, the low end of this range is about 10 times Fannie and Freddie's stock price.

It's still unlikely that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac will be released from conservatorship and allowed to recapitalize anytime soon, but the involvement of civil-rights groups like these definitely doesn't hurt.

Matthew Frankel não tem posição em nenhuma ação mencionada. O Motley Fool não tem posição em nenhuma das ações mencionadas. Experimente gratuitamente qualquer um dos nossos serviços de boletim informativo insípido por 30 dias. Nós, tolos, não podemos todos ter as mesmas opiniões, mas todos acreditamos que considerar uma gama diversificada de insights nos torna melhores investidores. The Motley Fool tem uma política de divulgação.

Matt trouxe seu amor de ensinar e investir para o Louco em 2012, a fim de ajudar as pessoas a investirem melhor. Matt é especialista em escrever sobre as melhores oportunidades em ações de bancos, REITs e finanças pessoais, mas adora qualquer investimento pelo preço certo. Siga-me no Twitter para acompanhar todas as melhores coberturas financeiras! Siga @TMFMathGuy.